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ARTICLES
DOES THE ICJ'S DECISION IN AVENA MEAN
ANYTHING TO MEXICANS ON DEATH ROW?
Kenneth Williams'

I. INTRODUCTION
Texas officials are diligent in their pursuit of death sentences and in
their efforts to carry them out. Prosecutors, for instance, have engaged
in blatant misconduct by withholding important evidence from
defendants.
They have used racially discriminatory tactics to keep
African-Americans off juries. Law enforcement officers have coerced
confessions out of defendants and have engaged in other types of
misconduct. Furthermore, the State has shown a willingness to execute
even those defendants whose culpability may have been diminished by
their age or mental infirmities. For instance, Texas led the nation in
and7
executing juveniles' until the Supreme Court banned this practice,'
- •
the State has executed defendants with serious mental impairments.
' Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia
School of Law. This Article was made possible by the generous support of Southwestern
University School of Law. I would also like to thank Professors Jonathan Miller and Mary
Pat Truehart for reading drafts and providing valuable feedback.
1. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675 (2004).
2. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2322-23 (2005).
3. See Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d 306, 329 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Kenneth
Williams, Texas: Tough on Murderers or on Fairness?, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 631, 635-43
(2005).
4. See, e.g., Tenard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276-78 (2004).
5. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, Texas executed thirteen
juvenile offenders between 1976 and January 1, 2005. Death Penalty Information Center,
Juvenile Offenders Executed, by State, 1976-2005, http://www.deathpenalty.org/article.
php?scid=27&did=882 (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). No other state executed more than
three juvenile offenders during this period. Id.
6. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).
7. See, e.g., Patterson v. Dretke, 370 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 541 U.S.
1058 (2004). Kelsey Patterson "consistently expressed the delusions that he killed the
victims only because devices implanted in his body by conspirators made him do it, and
that he has received a permanent stay of execution based upon his innocence." Id. at 483.
He believed that the State of Texas was his only friend. Id. at 481. In addition, a
psychologist found that Patterson suffered from bizarre delusions that impaired his
rational understanding of his conviction and pending execution and "that there [was] no
credible evidence that he [was] malingering his delusions or their effects on his
functioning." Id. As a result of Patterson's mental illness, the Texas Board of Pardons
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Prosecutors have argued that a defendant was retarded in order to secure
a death sentence and then, after the Supreme Court prohibited the
execution of mentally retarded individuals, argued on appeal that this
same defendant was not retarded.8
Now that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has decided that the
State violated the rights of Mexican nationals on its death row by not
informing them of their rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations,9 and the President has ordered state officials to comply with
this decision,'0 Texas officials have challenged the President's authority
to issue such an order." This Article will begin with background
information on the Vienna Convention and the dispute between the U.S.
and foreign governments over the failure of the U.S. to comply with the
treaty's consular notification provisions. Because Texas officials have
challenged the President's authority to order them to comply with the
ICJ's decision, this Article will analyze the legality of the President's
order. Next, this Article will discuss how the litigation is likely to
proceed in state and federal court and will make a proposal as to how the
inmates' consular notification claims ought to be resolved. Finally, the
Article will conclude with a discussion of why it is important to the U.S.
that the ICJ decision is fully complied with and that there be a credible
review of the inmates' cases.

and Paroles recommended to the Governor that his sentence be reduced to life
imprisonment. See Press Release, Tex. Office of the Governor, Gov. Rick Perry Denies
Commutation, Stay for Kelsey Patterson (May 18, 2004), http://www.governor.state.tx.us/
divisions/press/pressreleases/PressRelease.2004-05-18.3521.
The Governor, however,
refused to follow the Board's recommendation and Patterson was subsequently executed.
See id.
8.

See David Pasztor, 28 Years on Death Row, Still Alive, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,

Nov. 24, 2003, at Al.
9. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), at 59-60 (Mar. 31, 2004),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imusjudgment
20040331.pdf.

10. Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the United States, Memorandum for
the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/
02/20050228-18.html [hereinafter Memorandum for the Attorney General].
11. During the oral arguments in Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005), the
assistant attorney general arguing for the State of Texas stated: "We would respectfully
submit, as would any responsible state attorney general, that there are significant
constitutional problems with a unilateral Executive determination displacing generally
applicable criminal laws." Transcript of Oral Argument at *29, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088
(No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 817409. In response to the President's order, the Texas Attorney
General stated that "'the state of Texas believes no international court supersedes the
laws of Texas or the laws of the United States."' Mike Tolsen & Rosanna Ruiz, Mexicans
on Death Row May Get New Hearings, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 9, 2005, at Al (quoting

Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General).
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VIENNA CONVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The United States Senate ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations in 1969.12 Currently, 168 nations are party to the Convention. 34
Article 36 of the Convention is most pertinent to this discussion.
Article 36 is designed to "facilitat[e] the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State.' 5 It provides that "consular
officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State
and to have access to them.' 6 Article 36 further provides that
if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending
trial or is detained in any other manner.17
Furthermore, "[a]ny communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay."' 8 State authorities are
required to "inform the person concerned without delay of his rights
under [Article 36]."'"
Under Article 36, consular officers "have the right to visit a national of
the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and20
correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation.,
According to Article 36, rights contained therein "shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.",2' This
requirement, however, is "subject to the proviso

. . .

that the said laws

and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the22 purposes for
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.,
Until recently, the United States was also a party to the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention that mandates "[d]isputes arising out
of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the

12. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
Apr. 24, 1963,21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
13. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/
bible/englishinternetbible/partl/ChapterlIl/treaty31.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
14.

Vienna Convention, supra note 12, 21 U.S.T. at 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292, 294.

15. Id. at 100, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
16. Id. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
17. Id.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.

20.

Id.

21.
22.

Id.
Id., 596 U.N.T.S. at 292, 294.
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compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. 2 3 Any
4
party to the Optional Protocol may bring such disputes before the ICJ.1
Under the U.S. Constitution, treaties are "the supreme Law of the
Land."2 5 As such, they are enforceable in court as long as they are self26
executing and federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over any
cases and controversies arising under them.27 Although treaties cannot
violate the U.S. Constitution, 28 they are equivalent to a statute enacted by
Congress and are binding on the states. 29 Thus, the Vienna Convention
and the Optional Protocol are the law of the land.

III. U.S. LITIGATION
Although the Vienna Convention is the law of the land, noncompliance with the Article 36 notification requirements has been a
persistent problem. 0 This problem will only intensify as the number of

23. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. I, Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 488 [hereinafter Optional Protocol]. On March 7,
2005, the United States announced that it will no longer be a party to the Optional
Protocol:
"This letter constitutes notification by the United States of America that it
hereby withdraws from the [Consular Convention's Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes]. As a consequence of this
withdrawal, the United States will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol."
See Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush's DeterminationRegarding Mexican Nationals and
Consular Convention Rights, ASIL INSIGHTS, Mar. 2005 add., available at http://www.asil.
org/insights/2005/03/insights050309a.html (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from
Condoleezza Rice, Sec'y of State, to the United Nations Secretary-General (Mar. 7,
2005)). The President's authority to terminate a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate is
questionable. See Raoul Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan
Treaty, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 583 (1980); Louis Henkin, Editorial Comments, Litigating
the President'sPower to Terminate Treaties, AM. J.iNT'L L. 647, 651-54 (1979).
24. Optional Protocol, supra note 23, 21 U.S.T. at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488. The
United States was the first state party to invoke the Optional Protocol in the Tehran
Hostages Case. Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar.
10, 2005, at Al. See generally United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
26. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9 app. at 5 (1969) (statement of J. Edward Lyerly,
Deputy Legal Advisor for Administration to the Department of State). The State
Department has regarded the Vienna Convention as self-executing since its ratification.
Id.
27. U.S. CONST. art. ll,§ 2, cl.
1.
28. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (plurality opinion).
29. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
30. See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2088, 2096 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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noncitizens in U.S. prisons increases.31 Voluminous litigation has
resulted from state officials' failure to provide foreign nationals with the
notification required by Article 36.32 In most instances, state officials do
not deny that they failed to provide notification. Jose Medellin's
experience, for example, is fairly typical. After he was apprehended by
Houston officials for the murder of two Texas teenagers, Medellin told
the arresting officers in Texas that he was born in Laredo, Mexico.33 He
also told the booking authorities that he was not a U.S. citizen.34
Medellin, however, "was arrested, detained, tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death without ever being informed that he could contact the
Mexican consul., 35 Most of the litigation has centered on four issues: (1)
whether the Convention creates individually enforceable rights; (2)
whether the noncitizen must object at trial to preserve the issue for
appeal; (3) whether the foreign national must prove prejudice; and (4)
the appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation.36

Although the Supreme Court has left the issue of individual
enforceability of the Vienna Convention open,37 many lower courts have
not. 38 There is a presumption that international treaties do not create
rights that are privately enforceable in court.39 The Supreme Court
explained the rationale for this presumption as follows:
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations.
It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest
and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If
these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party
chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by
actual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts
have nothing to do and can give no redress. 0

31. Cf. id. ("[I]n 2003, over 56,000 noncitizens were held in state prisons [and a]s of
February 2005, 119 noncitizens from 31 nations were on state death row.").
32.

See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing

cases about Vienna Convention violations).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
(Tenn.

Medellin, 125 S.Ct. at 2089, 2097.
Id. at 2097.
Id.
See Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 390-93, 406.
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1998).
See, e.g., Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 391; Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 626
Crim. App. 2004); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (Va. 1998).

39.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a (1987) ("International agreements, even those directly
benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private
cause of action in domestic courts .... ).
40. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
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The courts are also reluctant to allow individual enforcement of
treaties for fear of interfering in the nation's foreign affairs. 4' The
Supreme Court has, however, recognized that a treaty can create
individually enforceable rights in some circumstances. 42 Lower courts
have based their conclusion that the Vienna Convention is not judicially
enforceable primarily on the language in its Preamble: "'[T]he purpose of
such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of
their respective States.' 43 In addition, courts have given deference to the
view of the State Department that the Convention is not judicially
enforceable, but rather that the remedies for violations of the
Convention are diplomatic, political, or exist between states under
international law. 4
There is also a general rule requiring that criminal defendants raise
objections at trial before an appellate court will consider any assertions
of error. Many defendants, including Jose Medellin, did not object to
the Article 36 violation until after they were convicted. 46 As a result of
the defendants' failure to object, appellate courts have often applied the
procedural default doctrine and have refused to consider the merits of
the inmates' Vienna Convention claim.47 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has intimated 48-and
numerous courts have held-that a
defendant must show prejudice to establish a violation of the
Convention.49 Courts have also disagreed with the inmates that the
remedy for a Vienna Convention violation should be the dismissal of an
indictment 0 or the exclusion of evidence obtained from the defendant. 1
Finally, civil suits seeking to enforce the Convention have also been
unsuccessful.52

41. See Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 394 ("A contrary conclusion risks aggrandizing the
power of the judiciary and interfering in the nation's foreign affairs, the conduct of which
the Constitution reserves for the political branches.").
42. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667-68 (1992).
43. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 392 (alteration in original) (quoting Vienna
Convention, supra note 12, 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262).
44. See, e.g., id.
45. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,731 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
686 (2004) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005).
47. Id. at 279-80.
48. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 987-88 (10th Cir. 2001).
50. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002).
51. See United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 2000).
52. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999);
Breard,523 U.S. at 377-78.
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IV. ICJ LITIGATION

Unable to obtain a satisfactory resolution in U.S. courts, a few nations
exercised their option under the Optional Protocol to seek redress in the
ICJ13 The ICJ has heard three significant cases regarding the United

States' obligations under the Vienna Convention.
1. Paraguayv. U.S.
Angel Francisco Breard was under suspicion for murder and
attempted rape.54 During a search of Breard's apartment, the Arlington,
Virginia police found his Paraguayan passport and therefore knew that
he was a Paraguayan national 5 The Arlington police, however, did not
inform Breard that he was entitled to contact the Paraguayan consulate
nor did they notify Paraguayan consulate officials of Breard's arrest.56
After he was indicted, Virginia officials offered Breard a life sentence if
he would agree to plead guilty.5 7 Because Paraguay does not permit plea

bargaining and in fact makes such deals null and void, Breard rejected
the offer. 8 He decided instead to testify and to confess his crime to the
jury. 9 In Paraguay, "[t]he principal means to obtain leniency.., would
be to confess to and denounce the criminal acts charged and appeal to
the mercy of the court." 6° The jury convicted Breard and the court
sentenced him to death.6'
Approximately three years later, Paraguayan officials learned of
Breard's imprisonment and pending execution.62 They informed Breard
of his rights to consular notification under the Vienna Convention and
explained to him the differences between the U.S. and Paraguayan legal

53.

Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico have sued the United States in the World Court.

Paraguay withdrew its case after its national was executed. See Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426, 427 (Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10).
Decisions were rendered on behalf of both Germany, see infra notes 74-84 and
accompanying text, and Mexico, see infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
54. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), para. 2.1 (Memorial of
the Republic of Paraguay) (Oct. 9, 1998), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm (follow "Written Pleadings" hyperlink; then follow
"Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay - 9 October 1998" hyperlink).
55. Id.
56. Id. paras. 2.1-.2.
57. Id. para. 2.3.
58. Id. paras. 2.6-.7.
59. Id. para. 2.8.
60. Id. para. 2.6.
61. Id. paras. 2.8-.10.
62. Id. para. 2.16.
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systems.63 By this time Breard was well into the appellate process. 64 He
raised for the first time, in his federal habeas petition, a claim based upon
the failure of Virginia officials to notify him of his rights to consular
access." The federal courts held that because the claim had not been
66
raised in state court, it was procedurally defaulted.
Paraguay sought to prevent his execution, both in U.S. courts 67 and in
the ICJ. It was successful in convincing the ICJ to issue an order that the
U.S. "'take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco
Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings.' 68 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
application of the procedural default doctrine and held that the ICJ's
order was not legally binding. 69 The Supreme Court suggested that the
only means of recourse for Breard was a reprieve from the Governor of
Virginia.70 The Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of Virginia
advising him that the ICJ's order was non-binding, but she requested a
delay of Breard's execution.7 ' The Governor refused to do so and Breard
was executed.72 Paraguay subsequently withdrew its complaint from the

2. Germany v. U.S.
Walter and Karl LaGrand were German nationals who lived most of
their lives in the United States.74 They were both convicted and
sentenced to death for their roles in an Arizona bank robbery. 75 Arizona
authorities conceded that the LaGrands were convicted and sentenced to
death without receiving the consular notification required by Article 36
76
and that the German consulate had not been notified of their arrests.
63.
64.

Id. paras. 2.16-.17.
See id. para. 2.16.

65. See id.
66. Id. para. 2.19.
67. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998).
68. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, para. 2.32 (quoting Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) (Order of Apr. 9, 1998)).
69. Breard,523 U.S. at 375.
70. See id. at 378. The Court wrote: "Ifthe Governor [of Virginia] wishes to wait for
the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows
us to make that choice for him." Id.
71. Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations, para. 2.41.
72.

See David Stout, Clemency Denied, Paraguayanis Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,

1998, at A18.
73. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426, 427
(Dissolution Order of Nov. 10).
74. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 475 (June 27).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 475-76.
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Arizona authorities further conceded that no notification was given even
after its officials became aware that the LaGrands were German
nationals and not U.S. citizens.77 Neither LaGrand brother objected to
the Vienna Convention violation until their cases were on appeal, and
thus the U.S. courts applied the procedural default doctrine and refused
to consider the merits of their claims. 8 Both LaGrand brothers were
subsequently executed despite diplomatic interventions by the German
government and despite a provisional order from the ICJ insisting that
Walter LaGrand not be executed pending the disposition of the ICJ
proceedings.79
Germany complained that, as a result of the Vienna Convention
violations, it was deprived of the opportunity to provide assistance to its
nationals. 80 Even though both LaGrand brothers were executed during
the proceedings, Germany, unlike Paraguay, sought redress for the
violations. Specifically, it sought to prevent the U.S. from raising the
procedural default doctrine in the future with respect to Vienna
Convention violations and an assurance from the U.S. that it would not
repeat its actions in the future.8' The main contention of the U.S. was
"that rights of consular notification and access under the Vienna
Convention are rights of States, and not
8 2 of individuals," even though
individuals may benefit from these rights.
The ICJ held that "it would be incumbent upon the United States to
allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by
taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention. 8 3 In addition, the court rejected the U.S. claim that the
Convention does not confer individual rights.84
3. Mexico v. U.S.

Mexico has long sought to provide consular assistance to its nationals
residing in the United States. In 1942, Mexico and the U.S. entered into
a bilateral consular agreements- as a result of the "frequent inter-state

77. Id. at 475.
78. Id. at 477-78.
79. Id. at 473.
80. Id. at 473-74.
81. Id. at 473.
82. Id. at 493-94.
83. Id. at 514.
84. Id. at 494.
85. Convention Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting
Consular Officers, U.S.-Mex., Aug. 12, 1942, 57 Stat. 800.
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travel of their respective citizens. 8 6 In 1965, Mexico ratified the Vienna
Convention in order to supplement its bilateral agreements."' In 1986,
Mexico developed the Program of Legal Consultation and Defense for
Mexicans Abroad in order to improve the work of its "consular officers
in American law for the express purpose of assisting attorneys
representing Mexican nationals in United States legal proceedings."88 In
2000, Mexico established the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program
in the U.S. in order to provide legal assistance to its nationals charged
with capital offenses. 89 Despite these efforts, Mexico's efforts to assist its
nationals and to ensure compliance with the Vienna Convention have
met with limited success. As a result, Mexico sought the assistance of the
ICJ.90

In 2003, Mexico commenced proceedings against the United States on
behalf of fifty-four of its nationals sentenced to death in the U.S. 9' In
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, Mexico complained that these

individuals were arrested, detained, tried, convicted, and sentenced to92
death without being allowed to exercise their rights under Article 36.
The ICJ agreed with Mexico that the U.S. breached its obligations to
Mexico under the Vienna Convention. Specifically, the court found the
following violations of the Convention:

86. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), para. 20 (Application to
Institute Proceedings) (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imusframe.htm (follow "Application" hyperlink).
87. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 13.
88. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, para. 22.
89. Id. para. 25.
90. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Judgment of Mar. 31,
2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (follow
"Judgment" hyperlink; then follow "Judgment of 31 March 2004" hyperlink). Mexico also
sought the assistance of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In an advisory
opinion, the court declared the failure to inform foreign nationals at the time of arrest of
the right to consult with a consular official was a violation of obligations under the
Consular Convention and that inmates who had been convicted and sentenced to death
without having been notified of their right to consult their consul had not been afforded
due process of law. See Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of
the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC16/99 (Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.cidh.org/migrantes/seriea-16_- ing.doc.
91. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), paras. 1, 12 (Judgment of
Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm
(follow "Judgment" hyperlink; then follow "Judgment of 31 March 2004" hyperlink). On
January 20, 2003, Mexico withdrew its request for provisional measures on behalf of three
of its nationals because their death sentences had been commuted. Id. para. 21.
92. Id. para. 12.
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1) failing to inform, without delay, 93 the Mexican nationals of
their rights under the Convention;
2) failing to inform, without delay, the Mexican consulate of the
detention of their nationals, thereby denying Mexico the
opportunity to render assistance to its nationals;
3) depriving Mexico of its rights to communicate with, and have
access to, its nationals in a timely manner;
4) depriving Mexico of the right to obtain legal representation
for its citizens in a timely fashion; and
5) failing to review and reconsider the convictions and
sentences of three Mexican nationals awaiting execution.
Mexico sought to have these convictions and sentences overturned and
any statements or other evidence obtained from its nationals prior to
receiving consular notification excluded from any criminal proceedings
subsequently brought against them.9
The court rejected Mexico's
request that their convictions and sentences be vacated.96 It agreed with
the U.S. that there had to be a determination whether the Vienna
Convention violation prejudiced the defendants. 97 Most significantly,
however, it agreed with Mexico that the inmates
S•
98 were entitled to a
reconsideration of their Vienna Convention claims. Although it left the
choice of means to the United States, the ICJ rejected the U.S. position
that the executive clemency process would provide sufficient review. 99
Furthermore, the court held that U.S. courts should be precluded from
applying the procedural default doctrine to these claims.'0°

93. The Court held that "without delay" doesn't necessarily mean immediately upon
arrest, but it does mean "as soon as it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or
once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national." Id. para.
88.
94. Id. paras. 106, 152.
95. Id. para. 13.
96. Id. para. 123.
97. Id. para. 127.
98. Id. para. 153, at 61.
99. Id. para. 143.

100. Id. para. 139. The court said:
In this regard, the Court would point out that what is crucial in the review and
reconsideration process is the existence of a procedure which guarantees that full
weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention,
whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration.
Id. The court also stressed that the clemency process would not provide adequate review.
Id. para. 143.
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REACTIONS

The top two law enforcement officials in Texas reacted negatively to
the ICJ's decision in Avena. Governor Rick Perry's spokesman stated
that "'[o]bviously the governor respects the world court's right to have an
opinion, but the fact remains they have no standing and no jurisdiction in
the state of Texas."' 0' A spokesman for the Texas Attorney General
proclaimed that "'[wle do not believe the World Court has jurisdiction in
these matters."' 01 2
Most of the reaction outside of Texas has not been nearly as negative.
In fact, there has been a grudging acknowledgement that the decision
demands compliance. For example, in a case involving a Mexican
national sentenced to death in Oklahoma without receiving the consular
notification required by the Vienna Convention, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals held that it was bound by the ICJ's decision.' 3 The
court granted a stay of execution and ordered an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the inmate was prejudiced by the denial of his
rights.' 4 The Governor of Oklahoma subsequently commuted his
sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a result
The Arkansas Attorney General's office
of the Arena decision.
dropped its effort to execute a Mexican national, and the Arena decision
provided the primary motivation for doing so.10 6 Furthermore, California
enacted a law requiring obligatory advisement of consular rights upon
of lists of imprisoned nationals to
incarceration and the provision
01 7
consulates upon request.
The most significant reaction was that of the President of the United
States. Recognizing the nation's obligation to comply with the ICJ's
judgment,'08 President George W. Bush issued the following directive:
101. U.S. Told to Review Cases of Mexicans Sentenced to Death, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Apr. 1, 2004, at Al (quoting Robert Black, spokesman for Governor Rick Perry).
102. Dane Schiller & Maro Robbins, Mexico Wins in World Court, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, at IA (quoting Paco Felici, spokesman for the Texas
Attorney General).
103. Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order
granting stay of execution and remanding case for evidentiary hearing) (on file with the
Catholic University Law Review).
104. Id.
105. See Triple Play in Oklahoma: Foreign National Gets Stay, New Hearing and
Clemency (May 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
106. See ICJ Decision Prompts Settlement in Arkansas Case (Aug. 2004),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
107. See New California Law Enhances Prisoners' Consular Rights (Oct. 2004),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.phpscid=31&did=579.
108. U.N. Charter art. 94(1). This article provides that "[e]ach member of the United
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
any case to which it is a party." Id.
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I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as
President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America, that the United States will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International
Court of Justice .. .by having state courts give effect to the
decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases
filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.'9
The next section discusses the legality of the President's order.
VI. LEGALITY

The primary objection that Texas is likely to raise is that the
President's order intrudes upon its sovereignty. Under our federal
system, an essential attribute of the states' retained sovereignty is that
they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of
authority. As Justice Scalia has correctly stated:
The great innovation of this design was that "our citizens would
have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each
protected from incursion by the other"-"a legal system
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
"' °
people who sustain it and are governed by it.
The state's autonomy is greatest when it is defining and enforcing its
criminal laws."' Texas officials will likely argue that the President's
directive, ordering reconsideration of cases previously reviewed by Texas
courts, requires its judges to violate state law and is therefore an
unconstitutional encroachment on Texas' sovereignty. Furthermore,
they will argue that even if the Avena decision is binding as federal law,
the Supreme Court has resisted 1 2federal attempts to conscript state
officials into enforcing federal law.
There is one major flaw in these arguments. While it is true that the
courts have held that federal efforts to compel state executive officers to
execute federal law are unconstitutional, the Constitution actually
compels state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those

109.
110.

Memorandum for the Attorney General, supra note 10.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc.

v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

111. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("The States' core police powers have always included authority to define
criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.").
112. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 920-21 (holding that state officials cannot be required to
enforce federal law).
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prescriptions are related to matters appropriate to judicial power."'
State judges, for instance, have been required in the past to enforce the
fugitive slave laws, conduct naturalization proceedings, resolve
controversies between a captain and the crew of his ship, and enforce
laws requiring the deportation of alien enemies in times of war." 4 Thus,
there is historical and legal support for President Bush's order.
Another related objection is likely to be that "[b]y invoking foreign
authority to trump state law, the [President] has explicitly ceded
American sovereignty to foreign institutions that are not accountable to
the American people. ' " 5 This argument can be countered by the fact
that the President and the Senate have the constitutional authority to
bind the states to decisions of the ICJ, which they did by ratifying the
Vienna Convention and the Optional Protocol.
President Bush has several additional arguments that he can advance
in support of his actions. The President will cite his constitutional duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'. 6 As a result, he is
obligated to enforce the Avena decision since it is federal law under our
constitutional system. In addition, he may argue that the courts have
recognized the plenary power of the President to conduct foreign
affairs." 7 Pursuant to this power, the courts have been willing to allow
Presidents to settle disputes with foreign nations as long as Congress has
not taken any action specifically prohibiting the executive from doing so.

113. Id. at 907.
These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally
understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce
federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions related to matters
appropriate for the judicial power. That assumption was perhaps implicit in one
of the provisions of the Constitution, and was explicit in another. In accord with
the so-called Madisonian Compromise, Article III, § 1, established only a
Supreme Court, and made the creation of lower federal courts optional with the
Congress-even though it was obvious that the Supreme Court alone could not
hear all federal cases throughout the United States. And the Supremacy Clause
announced that "the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby." It is
understandable why courts should have been viewed distinctively in this regard;
unlike legislatures and executives, they applied the law of other sovereigns all the
time. The principle underlying so-called "transitory" causes of action was that
laws which operated elsewhere created obligations in justice that courts of the
forum State would enforce.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 905-07.
115. Lawrence Connell, The Supreme Court, Foreign Law, and Constitutional
Governance,11 WIDENER L. REV. 59, 71 (2004).
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

117.

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
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For instance, in United States v. Belmont," 8 the President negotiated an
agreement with the Soviet government to settle the claims of U.S.
citizens whose property in the Soviet Union had been nationalized. 9 A
lower court held that the part of the agreement requiring a New York
banker to release Soviet assets violated the public policy of the State of
New York.1 20 The Supreme Court held, however, that New York's public
policy had been superseded by the presidential agreement:
In respect to all international negotiations and compacts, and in
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.
As to such purposes the State of New York does not exist.
Within the field of its powers, whatever the United States
rightfully undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate.
And when judicial authority is invoked in aid of such
consummation, state constitutions, state laws, and state policies
are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision. It is inconceivable
to the
that any of them can be interposed as an obstacle
2
1
effective operation of a federal constitutional power.
22
President Carter was allowed
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,1
"to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts
involving claims of United States persons and institutions
against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments
and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation
based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of
such claims through binding arbitration"123
pursuant to an agreement with Iran to obtain the release of U.S. hostages
being held by Iranian militants with the support of the Iranian
government. 24 After his inauguration, President Reagan reaffirmed
President Carter's order and suspended all legal claims "'pending in any
court of the United States. '" 125 Dames & Moore had previously sued Iran
to recover money owed to its subsidiary under a service contract and
brought an action challenging the validity of the presidential authority to
suspendbecause
claims pending in U.S. courts. 26 The President's action was
upheld

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

301 U.S. 324 (1937).
See id. at 326.
Id. at 327.
Id. at 331-32.
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
Id. at 665 (quoting Application to Petition for Certiorari at 22).
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 666 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (Feb. 24, 1981)).
Id. at 663-64, 666-67.
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the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute
between our country and another, and where, as here, we can
conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we
are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to
settle such claims. 27
In light of the fact that Congress seems to have acquiesced in the
President's action by adopting the Optional Protocol, the fact that state
courts are obligated to enforce federal law, and the deference that courts
have traditionally given Presidents in conducting foreign relations, the
President's directive ordering the state courts in Texas and elsewhere to
review the inmates' convictions appears to be lawful and therefore
mandatory, and trumps any state laws which may conflict with the order.
VII. COURT PROCEEDINGS
A. State Court

The fifty-one Mexican nationals who were the subject of the Avena
litigation are at different stages in their appellate proceedings. Some are
currently in direct appeal; others are seeking either state or federal
habeas relief. 2 8 At least three had exhausted their appeals when the
Avena decision was handed down. 129 Normally, those on direct appeal
can raise the Vienna Convention claim in their state habeas proceedings
as long as they objected either at pre-trial or at trial. Those who were
in state habeas proceedings can probably amend their petitions to
include the Vienna Convention claim, again, as long as they objected
earlier. Those inmates, like Jose Medellin, who have exhausted their
state habeas remedy are precluded from having new claims considered in
most instances.' The President's order, however, directs the state courts
in Texas to consider each inmate's Vienna Convention claim irrespective
of state law.
It is not clear how Texas and other state courts will respond to the
President's order. They could (1) accept that the ICJ's judgment and the
President's directive legally obligates them to consider each inmate's
Vienna Convention claim anew; (2) reject the President's directive and
127.

Id. at 688.

128.

See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 6, 18 (Mar.

31).
129. Id.
130. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), paras. 32-33 (Application
to Institute Proceedings) (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imusframe.htm (follow "Application" hyperlink).

131.

Id. paras. 38-39.
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decline to consider the claims of those inmates who have exhausted the
state habeas process on the grounds suggested by state officials that
neither the ICJ's judgment nor the President's directive is binding on a
state court; (3) consider the claims as a matter of comity but dismiss the
inmates' claims on procedural grounds, for instance, that the convention
does not confer individual rights or that the claim was procedurally
defaulted by those inmates who failed to object earlier; or (4) accept the
ICJ's judgment as a matter of comity and accept the ICJ's conclusion that
the Convention confers individual rights and precludes the procedural
default doctrine from being invoked to deny consideration of the merits
of the inmates' claims.
The Texas courts should consider the cases on the merits in light of the
President's order. Once they accept the cases, the courts will have to
decide how to resolve the cases. They may take the same position that
the Convention does not confer individual rights. By ordering the Texas
courts to consider the inmates' claims, the President has obviously taken
the opposite position and under the Supremacy Clause, his position must
prevail. The ICJ also indicated that the procedural default doctrine
should not preclude relief, a position that should also prevail as a result
of the President's order. The ICJ did, however, indicate that the inmates
would have to prove that they were prejudiced by the violation of their
rights under the Convention in order to prevail. 32 Thus, the Texas courts
must determine whether the inmates suffered any prejudice.
The Texas courts should find that any inmate who was offered and
rejected a life sentence was prejudiced by the failure to receive consular
notification. Angel Francisco Breard's case is a perfect illustration of
how such inmates were harmed by not having consular assistance.
Breard did not fully understand the differences between the U.S. and
Paraguayan systems. 13 He was under the impression that a plea bargain
would be rejected, as they are in Paraguay, and that the wiser course of
action would be to confess and plead for mercy before the jury because
confessions are the preferred course of action in Paraguay.14 Had the
Paraguayan consulate been notified in a timely manner, it would have
explained to him the differences between the two legal systems and
would have advised him to accept the offer.'35 Any inmate who rejected
a plea offer from state officials would have been adversely affected by

132. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2090-91 (2005).
133. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), para. 2.11 (Memorial
of the Republic of Paraguay) (Oct. 9, 1998), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm (follow "Written Pleadings" hyperlink; then follow
"Memorial of the Republic of Paraguay - 9 October 1998" hyperlink).
134. Id. para. 4.30.
135. Id. para. 2.12.
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the failure to discuss such an offer with his consulate officials and should
be entitled to relief.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is essential that capital
defendants be allowed to present mitigating evidence.136 The bulk of a
foreign national's mitigating evidence would be in his home country.
The Mexican consulate would have been able to assist trial counsel in
securing mitigating evidence in Mexico. Therefore, an inmate who
secured mitigating evidence after he was sentenced to death with the
assistance of the Mexican government should be entitled to relief.
Finally, the courts should treat a confession obtained in violation of the
Vienna Convention the same as it would a confession obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona.137 The rationale for excluding
confessions without providing Miranda warnings is that the interrogation
process is often so intimidating to a suspect that the confession may not
be reliable.1 38 A confession which is obtained from a foreign national,
who is often unfamiliar with the American legal system, is also
unreliable.
Therefore, any inmate from whom a confession was
extracted without providing consular access should have his conviction
and sentence reevaluated in the same manner that a Miranda-defective
confession would be. Thus, if the admission of the confession harmed
the defendant, he should be entitled to a new trial.
Because Texas courts are notorious for not granting relief to death row
inmates, it is likely that most, if not all, of these cases will end up in
federal court.
B. FederalCourt

Once the inmates' Vienna Convention claim has been considered by
the state courts, they are allowed to seek relief in federal court. Their
federal court proceedings will be governed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 39 The AEDPA controls the
14 °
process by which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief.
This statute was enacted in 1996 for the purpose of streamlining death
penalty and other inmate appeals. Those inmates who are not successful
the AEDPA's
in state court in obtaining relief will have to overcome
1 41
many hurdles in order to obtain relief in federal court.

136.
137.
138.
139.

See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 464-68.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §§

2241-2255 (2000).
140.
141.

See id.
See id. § 2241(c)-(d).
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The first issue the federal courts will have to resolve is whether the
AEDPA is even applicable in these cases in light of the President's
order. In Avena, the court held that the inmates' Vienna Convention
claims had to receive a review and reconsideration "which guarantees
that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the
Vienna Convention.' ' 1 2 An argument can be made that, given this
holding, the AEDPA is not applicable since it would not permit full
review and reconsideration of the inmates' claim.
As discussed earlier, federal statutes and treaties are both the supreme
law of the land and are on equal footing in our constitutional system. In
the event of a conflict between the two, the courts have long applied the
rule that the one last in date will control the other. 4 1 Since the AEDPA
was enacted well after the Convention was ratified, the Supreme Court
has held that the AEDPA should take precedence in these cases.'" The
"latest in time" rule has usually been applied, however, where it is clear
that Congress intended to overrule the previous enactment. 45 In this
case, there is no evidence that Congress even considered, and certainly
never intended by the enactment of the AEDPA, to override the nation's
obligations under the Vienna Convention.'4 Nevertheless, the federal
courts are likely to continue to hold that the AEDPA takes precedence
47
over the Convention and apply it in assessing the inmates' claims.
Each inmate will have to overcome the provision of the AEDPA that
requires that tremendous deference be given to both the factual and legal
determinations of state courts. A state court's factual determinations can
be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.' 48 A state
142.
143.

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 6, 53 (Mar. 31).
See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) ("'[T]hat an Act of Congress

*..is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is
inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null."'
(quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion) (second alteration in
original))); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that if a treaty and a
federal statute conflict, "the one last in date will control the other").
144. See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2098 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
145. See, e.g., Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99
(1884).
146. In Murray v. Schooner CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), the Supreme

Court announced that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains." Id. at 118. There is no indication
that Congress sought to impede U.S. compliance with the Vienna Convention or any other
international obligation when it enacted the AEDPA. See United States v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (construing an antiterrorism
statute to avoid placing U.S. in violation of international law by finding that Congress did
not know that the statute would be incompatible with U.S. obligations).
147.
148.

See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
See AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2000).
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court's legal conclusions can be overturned only if unreasonable or
contrary to clearly established federal law.1 49 A decision that conflicts
with federal law is not entitled to deference. Should the state courts take
the position some state courts have taken, that the Convention does not
confer individual rights,
such a decision would be contrary to the
President's order and not entitled to any deference. If the state courts
determine that the inmates were not prejudiced by the failure to receive
notification, the inmates would have the difficult task 5of proving not only
that the decision was incorrect but also unreasonable.1 '
As a result of the AEDPA, it is going to be a challenge for the
Mexican inmates to obtain federal habeas relief in the event that their
claims are denied by the state courts.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. has several interests at stake in these cases. First, and most
obviously, every nation, especially the U.S., has an interest in nations
complying with international law. More specifically, given the frequency
with which Americans travel abroad, full compliance with the Vienna

Convention is in the country's interest.
Second, as the most frequent
litigator before the ICJ,'53 high level and uniform compliance with ICJ
decisions is essential and this case provides the U.S. with an opportunity
to stress the importance of compliance. 54 Finally, the U.S. has an interest
149. See id. § 2254(d)(1).
150. See, e.g., Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004); Kasi v.
Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64 (Va. 1998).
151. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411-13 (2000) ("[An unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneousapplication of federal
law.").
152. Stephen M. Schwebel, an American judge on the World Court from 1981-2000
and its president from 1997-2000, declared:
No country has more at stake in performance under the [Vienna] treaty than
does the U.S., many thousands of whose citizens travel the world. When
Americans abroad are arrested, the importance of assuring that they can contact
a U.S. consul in order to communicate with their families and benefit by the
assistance of legal counsel is obvious. But it is reciprocal. If police and courts in
the U.S. routinely ignore their obligations under that convention, how can it be
expected that U.S. nationals will enjoy its protection?
Stephen M. Schwebel, Letter to the Editor, Why We Need InternationalCourt of Justice,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2004, at A15.
153. The United States has been involved in more ICJ cases than any other state. See
International Court of Justice, List of Contentious Cases by Country, http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idecisions/icasesbycountry.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
154. About eighty percent of the ICJ's decisions from 1946 to 1987 have been
complied with. See Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International
Court of Justice Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 434, 460 (2004). Since 1987, approximately
sixty percent of the ICJ's decisions have been complied with. See id.
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in a strong relationship with Mexico.'55 The two nations share a border,
there is a strong economic relationship between the two nations, as
evidenced by the North American Free Trade Agreement, and Mexico's
cooperation is essential to U.S. efforts to fight terrorism, curtail illegal
immigration, and combat drug trafficking. Therefore, the failure to fully
comply with the Avena decision could severely damage U.S.-Mexican
relations.
President Bush responded appropriately to the Avena decision. This
Article has demonstrated that he had the authority to issue the directive
that he issued. Given the importance of this case to the U.S. and Mexico,
should the state courts refuse to comply with his order, the President
should seek to force their compliance. Compliance, however, does not
mean that the inmates' long journey through the U.S. and international
court systems will ultimately be successful.

155.

For a discussion of U.S. relations with Mexico, see Reynaldo Anaya Valencia et

al., Avena and the World Court's Death Penalty Jurisdictionin Texas: Addressing the Odd
Notion of Texas's Independence from the World, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 455, 460-65

(2005).
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